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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- FOURTH AMENDMENT- SEARCH AND SEIZURE-
IMPEACHMENT - CROSS-EXAMINATION -The United States Supreme
Court has held that a defendant witness may be impeached on cross-
examination by evidence which is unlawfully obtained and not admis-
sible in the Government's case in chief provided that the questions on
cross-examination are resasonably related to matters covered on direct
examination.
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
J. Lee Havens and John Kenneth McLeroth arrived in Miami,
Florida on October 2, 1977 on a flight from Lima, Peru. A search of
McLeroth in Miami revealed that cocaine was sewed into makeshift
pockets in a T-shirt that he was wearing under his outergarments.
Thereupon, McLeroth implicated Havens. Havens' luggage was seized
and searched without a warrant. Havens' luggage contained no drugs;
however, a T-shirt was seized that contained holes that corresponded
with the pieces which had been sewn to McLeroth's T-shirt.' The
T-shirt was suppressed on a motion prior to trial. Havens was tried in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
where McLeroth testified against him. McLeroth testified that Havens
supplied him with the T-shirt and sewed the makeshift pockets shut.
Havens, testifying in his defense, denied involvement in the cocaine
smuggling scheme.2 On cross-examination Havens denied involvement
in the sewing of cotton swatches to make pockets and he also denied
being in possession of the cut-up T-shirt.' Havens was convicted of con-
1. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 621-22 (1980).
2. Id at 622. On direct examination Havens testified as follows:
Q. And you heard Mr. McLeroth testify earlier as to something to the effect
that this material was taped or draped around his body and so on, you heard that
testimony?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you ever engage in that kind of activity with Mr. McLeroth and Augusto
or Mr. McLeroth and anyone else on that fourth visit to Lima, Peru?
Id, at 622-23.
3. On cross-examination Havens testified as follows:
Q. Now, on direct examination, sir, you testified that on the fourth trip you had
absolutely nothing to do with the wrapping of any bandages or tee shirts or
anything involving Mr. McLeroth; is that correct?
A. I don't-I said I had nothing to do with any wrapping or bandages or
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spiring to import cocaine,4 of importing cocaine,5 and of knowingly and
intentionally possessing cocaine with an intent to distribute."
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, Havens contended that the district court erred in admitting the il-
legally seized T-shirts for the purpose of impeaching his testimony
elicited on cross-examination.7 The court of appeals, relying on Agnello
v. United States8 and Walder v. United States,9 reversed the decision
anything, yes. I had nothing to do with anything with McLeroth in connection with
this cocaine matter.
Q. And your testimony is that you had nothing to do with the sewing of the cot-
ton swatches to make pockets on that tee shirt?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Sir, when you came through Customs, the Miami International Airport, on
October 2, 1977, did you have in your suitcase Size 38-40 medium tee shirts? ...
An objection to the latter question was overruled and questioning continued:
Q. On that day, sir, did you have in your luggage a Size 38-40 medium man's tee
shirt with swatches of clothing missing from the tail of that tee shirt?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Mr. Havens, I'm going to hand you what is Government's Exhibit 9 for iden-
tification and ask you if this tee shirt was in your luggage on October 2nd, 1975
[sic]?
A. Not to my knowledge. No.
I& at 622-23 (citations omitted).
4. United States v. Havens, 592 F.2d 848, 849 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd 446 U.S. 620
(1980). See 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), 963 (1976).
5. 592 F.2d at 849 n.2. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(4) (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
6. 592 F.2d at 849 n.2. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
7. United States v. Havens, 592 F.2d 848, 849 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 446 U.S. 620
(1980).
8. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). In Agnello the defendant was charged with conspiring to sell a
package of cocaine. Id at 28. On direct examination the defendant testified that he
possessed the package but was ignorant of its contents. On cross-examination he denied
ever having seen narcotics or a can of cocaine that was exhibited to him and that was
unlawfully seized from his apartment. The Government was permitted to introduce the
can of cocaine for purposes of rebutting the statements made on cross-examination. Id. at
29-30. The Supreme Court reversed Agnello's conviction noting that the defendant did not
testify on direct examination concerning the can of cocaine. Because the matter was first
raised on cross-examination, the defendant did nothing to waive his constitutional protec-
tion or to justify cross-examination regarding the can of cocaine and, therefore, the Court
held that the impeaching evidence was improperly admitted. Id. at 35.
9. 347 U.S. 62 (1954). In Walder the defendant was tried for illicit transactions in-
volving narcotics. On a prior occasion he was indicted for possession of heroin. On that oc-
casion, suppression of a heroin capsule resulted in dismissal of the criminal action. At his
trial for the latter offense, the defendant testified on direct examination that he never
possessed, sold, or purchased narcotics. Id. at 62-63. On cross-examination the defendant
denied ever having narcotics taken from him, including a specific reference to the
unlawfully seized heroin from the prior occassion. In order to impeach the defendant's
statements made on direct and cross-examination, the prosecution put the officers who
conducted the illegal search on the stand, along with the chemist who analyzed the heroin
capsule. Id. at 64. The Court held that the defendant's denial on direct examination of
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of the district court and held that illegally seized evidence may be used
for impeachment only if the evidence contradicts a particular state-
ment made by the defendant in the course of his direct examination."
After granting certiorari," the United States Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the circuit court and held that a defendant's statements
made in response to cross-examination questions reasonably suggested
by the defendant's direct testimony, are subject to impeachment by
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. 12
Writing for the majority,1 Justice White rejected the lower court's
reliance on Agnello, as well as its interpretation of Walder and its
progeny." Justice White stated that in Agnello the defendant was not
asked nor did he testify about the illegally seized evidence on direct
examination. He also emphasized that the Court has since repudiated
the language of Agnello that articulated a blanket prohibition against
the use of illegally obtained evidence. 5 The majority pointed out that
subsequent cases such as Walder, Harris v. New York, 6 and Oregon v.
Hass,"7 have sanctioned the use of unlawfully obtained evidence to im-
ever having possessed narcotics was sufficient to allow the Government to impeach his
credibility by introducing testimony regarding the illegally seized heroin capsule. Id at
65.
10. United States v. Havens, 592 F.2d at 851-52.
11. 444 U.S. 962 (1979).
12. 446 U.S. at 627-28.
13. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined in
Justice White's majority opinion. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Marshall joined. Justices Stewart and Stevens joined in Part I of Justice
Brennan's dissent.
14. 446 U.S. at 625.
15. Id. The language in Agnello that was later repudiated consisted of a quotation
from an earlier case where the Court noted that the exclusionary rule not only required
that evidence obtained in violation of the law, "shall not be used before the Court, but
that it shall not be used at all." Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
392 (1920), quoted-in Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. at 35.
16. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Harris the police took statements from the defendant
shortly after his arrest for violation of drug laws. The statements were taken in violation
of the defendant's fifth amendment Miranda rights. At trial, portions of the defendant's
direct testimony conflicted with statements given to the police. Id. at 222-23. The Court,
in deciding that these statements were admissible for purposes of impeaching the defend-
ant's direct testimony, stated that "[tlhe shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted
into a license to use perjury by way of defense, free from the risk of confrontation with
prior inconsistent utterances." Id. at 226. The Harris Court also stated that sufficient
deterrence of proscribed police conduct flowed when the evidence was made unavailable
to the Government in its case in chief. Id. at 225. According to the Havens majority, Har-
ris also made clear that impeachment by otherwise inadmissible evidence is not limited to
collateral matters. 446 U.S. at 625.
17. 420 U.S. 714 (1975). In Hass the Court reaffirmed the basic tenets of the Harris
decision. Id. at 722. The Hass Court held that utterances made after a suspect is advised
of his Miranda rights, but before he is counseled by a lawyer, are admissible to impeach a
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peach the direct testimony of a criminal defendant, even though the
evidence is inadmissible in the Government's case in chief.18 The Court
rejected the court of appeals' interpretation of these cases that
unlawful evidence may not be used on rebuttal to impeach a
defendant's credibility unless the evidence is offered to contradict a
particular statement made by a defendant on his direct examination.
The majority reasoned that a flat rule that would permit only
statements made on direct examination to be impeached misap-
prehends the underlying rationale of Walder, Harris, and Hass. 9 The
majority maintained that these cases repudiate Agnello's absolute bar
on the admissibility of illegally seized evidence. 0 Furthermore, accord-
ing to the majority, Walder implies that the cross-examination in
Agnello was too tenuously connected with any subject opened up on
direct examination to permit impeachment by tainted evidence.2'
The Court maintained that the court of appeals failed to consider
how closely the cross-examination was related to matters explored on
direct examination. According to the majority, if the questions put to
Havens on cross would have been suggested to a reasonably competent
cross-examiner by Haven's direct testimony, they were not "smuggled
in."2 Additionally, the Court maintained that forbidding the Govern-
ment to impeach the answers fails to take into account precedent such
as Harris and Hass." In both of these cases, the Court stressed the im-
portance of truth in criminal trials,24 and held that the deterrent func-
tion of excluding evidence is sufficiently served by denying its use in
defendant's direct testimony which contradicts those statements. Id at 723-24. The Court
noted that the testimony was elicited from the defendant after he knew that the con-
tradictory statements previously given to the police were ruled inadmissible in the
Government's case in chief. Thus, according to the Court, Hass was an example of a
defendant using exclusion as a license to commit perjury. IdM- at 722.
18. 446 U.S. at 624.
19. Id at 625. See notes 8, 9, 16, 17 supra.
20. See note 15 supra.
21. 446 U.S. at 625.
22. The term "smuggled in" was used by the Court in Walder to describe the
Government's activity in Agnello which amounted to questioning the accused on cross-
examination about subjects never opened up on direct and then impeaching the expected
response with the illegally obtained evidence. Thus, the Government was able to do in-
directly what it could not do directly, ie., put the unlawfully obtained evidence into the
case. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. at 66. See also 446 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
23. 446 U.S. at 626.
24. The majority stated that these cases emphasized the importance of arriving at
the truth in criminal matters, as well as the defendant's obligation to speak the truth in
response to proper questioning. Id See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 722; Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. at 225.
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the Government's case in chief.' According to the Court, there is only
a speculative possibility that deterrence would be furthered by making
the evidence inadmissible for all purposes.2
Although recognizing that neither Harris nor Hass involved the im-
peachment of assertedly false testimony first given on cross-
examination, the majority maintained that the reasoning of those cases
controlled Havens.' Because arriving at the truth is a fundamental
goal of our legal system,' the Havens Court deemed it essential to the
proper functioning of the adversary system to allow the Government
proper and effective cross-examination to elicit the truth.' Therefore,
the majority concluded that for purposes of impeaching a defendant's
seeming false testimony, there is no difference of constitutional
significance between a defendant's statements on direct examination
and his answers to questions put to him on cross-examination. The
majority also noted that the policies of the exclusionary rule are ade-
quately implemented by barring the use of the evidence in the Govern-
ment's case in chief. Any incremental furthering of the deterrence
function of the exclusionary rule is outweighed by the need to protect
the integrity of the factfinding goals of the criminal trial."
Finally, the majority rejected Havens' contention that because of
the illegal search and seizure, the Government's questions were im-
proper cross-examination in the first instance.3 2 According to the ma-
jority, the court of appeals did not suggest that the cross-examination
questions nor the impeachment of Havens' testimony would have been
improper absent the use of illegally seized evidence. The Court, in
reviewing the testimony of Havens," concluded that the cross-
examination was proper because it grew out of his direct testimony.
Therefore, the ensuing impeachment did not violate Havens' constitu-
tional rights.
Writing for the dissent,35 Justice Brennan maintained that the ma-
25. 446 U.S. at 626. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 722; Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. at 225. See generally MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 166 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
26. 446 U.S. at 626. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 723; Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. at 225.
27. 446 U.S. at 626.
28. I&
29. Id- at 627.
30. Id.
31. I&
32. Id- at 628.
33. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
34. 446 U.S. at 628.
35. Justice Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion. Justices Stewart
and Stevens joined in Part I of Justice Brennan's opinion in which he contended that the
majority's holding is a break from precedent.
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jority had taken from criminal defendants their unfettered right to
elect whether to take the stand in their own behalf 8 He viewed the
decision not only as an unwarranted departure from precedent, but
also an another case in a trend to deprecate constitutional protections
of the criminally accused.3 7
According to Justice Brennan, the Agnello holding controls the
Havens case, and subsequent decisions, including Walder, Harris, and
Hass, have left Agnello undisturbed." Justice Brennan pointed out that
although Walder allowed introduction of unlawfully seized evidence to
impeach an accused's false assertions about prior conduct offered dur-
ing direct examination, the Walder Court went to great lenghts to
distinguish its holding from Agnello. The Walder opinion, Justice Bren-
nan continued, was distinguished from Agnello on the ground that in
Agnello the Government attempted to smuggle the evidence in on
cross-examination.3 9 Justice Brennan also contended that neither the
Harris and Hass decisions indicated that Agnello had lost vitality, nor
that the distinction between direct and cross-examination testimony
that the Walder Court perceived as vital had been effaced. 0 The actual
principle of Agnello, as discerned by Walder, is that the Government
is not permitted to introduce suppressed evidence based on cross-
examination testimony unless such introduction is warranted by the
defendant's statements on direct questioning. This principle, according
to Justice Brennan, is not inconsistent with the Court's later cases for-
bidding a defendant to take advantage of suppression to advance per-
jurous claims in his direct case. Justice Brennan also maintained that
Agnello does not turn upon the tenuity of the link between the cross-
examination questions and the subject matter covered on direct ex-
amination."1 According to Justice Brennan, the cross-examination of the
defendant in Agnello was reasonably related to his direct testimony.
Therefore, the constitutional flaw in Agnello was that the introduction of
the tainted evidence had been prompted by statements of the accused
36. 446 U.S. at 629 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. Id. In Walder the defendant went beyond a general denial of complicity in the
crimes charged and made sweeping statements on direct examination that he never pur-
chased, sold, or possessed narcotics. In so doing, the defendant relied on the
Government's inability to use the suppressed evidence. In contrast, Agnello made no
reference to the suppressed evidence. It was first mentioned by the prosecutor on cross-
examination. Id See notes 3, 9, 22 supra.
40. 446 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan emphasized that both
Harris and Hass involved impeachment by the use of unlawfully obtained evidence of
statements made on direct examination by a criminal defendant. Id. See notes 16 & 17
supra.
41. 446 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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first elicited on cross-examination. Because Justice Brennan believed
that Agnello was so read by the Court in Walder, he was impelled to the
conclusion that Walder required as a prerequisite for introduction of the
tainted evidence direct testimony by the accused which relies on the
Government's disability to challenge his credibility."2 According to
Justice Brennan, the majority's interpretation of Agnello and Waider
trivialized the fourth amendment holdings of those decisions into
nothing more than a constitutional reflection of the common law rule of
relevance."
Justice Brennan also pointed out that although the narrow exception
to the exclusionary rule established by Harris and Hass may be easily
cabined if defense counsel foregoes certain areas of questioning on
direct examination, the majority opinion passed control of the excep-
tion to the Government. A prosecutor can lay the foundation for admis-
sion of otherwise inadmissible evidence with his own questioning."
Therefore, a criminal defendant will be forced to forego testifying on
his own behalf to prevent the introduction of the suppressed
evidence. 5
Part II of Justice Brennan's dissent is grounded in a more fun-
damental difference with the majority than interpretation of prior case
law. Justice Brennan stated that the approach taken by the Court in
Harris, Hass, and now in Havens, severely undercuts the constitutional
canon that convictions cannot be obtained by governmental lawbreak-
ing.6 For Justice Brennan, the most troubling aspect of the decision
42. Id at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan pointed out that the Walder
Court emphasized the importance of permitting a defendant to deny the crimes charged
without permitting the prosecution to put the unlawfully obtained evidence into the case
on rebuttal. Id See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Because the law of
evidence permits the cross-examination of a defendant about his denial of complicity in
the crime charged, Walder must be read as imposing the additional requirement that the
accused make a contradictory statement on direct examination. 446 U.S. at 631 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
44. 446 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also noted that tradi-
tional evidentiary principles allow wide latitude in cross-examination. See MCCORMICK,
supra note 25, at §§ 21-24.
45. 446 U.S. at 632 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan quoted the Walder opi-
nion noting that "the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet
the accusations against him." Id at 632 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. at 65).
46. 446 U.S. at 633. (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 724-25
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis expressed this sentiment in his now famous dissent in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), when he stated:
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
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was the determination that the slight advancement of constitutional
ends is not sufficient to exclude tainted evidence.47 Justice Brennan
emphasized that although the search for truth remains a fundamental
goal of our legal system, the Constitution does not countenance police
misbehavior. Accordingly, the search for truth must remain consonant
with the protections enshrined in the Constitution.48 The balance
struck by the majority between the policies found in the Bill of Rights
and the interest in accurate trial determinations was, according to
Justice Brennan, freewheeling. 9 This approach does not apply criteria
intrinsic to the fourth and fifth amendments, but rather, deters police
misconduct by declaring that so much exclusion is enough. The
ultimate effect of this balance is to obscure judicial and legislative
policy making and to treat fourth and fifth amendment freedoms as
mere incentive schemes, and thus denegrate their unique status as con-
stitutional protections.
The exclusionary rule has been recognized in fourth amendment
jurisprudence since the Supreme Court's decision in Weeks v. United
States.1 The rule mandates that evidence that is procured by an
unlawful search and seizure shall not be admissible as substantive
evidence of guilt in a criminal prosecution against a party whose rights
were violated.52 That the rule is grounded in the fourth amendment is
a view that from time to time has enjoyed the support of various
members of the Court and several commentators.5 Justifications for
exclusion which are not based on constitutional grounds have also been
advanced. These other justifications for the rule rest on the dual
premises that exclusion maintains the integrity of the judiciary,5' and
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the
Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this
Court should resolutely set its face.
Id at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
47. 446 U.S. at 633 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id at 634 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The rule was made binding 6n the states through the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
52. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 393.
53. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 657 (Black, J., concurring) (fourth and fifth amendments com-
bine to compel the exclusionary rule as a matter of Constitutional law); Schrock & Welsh,
Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L.
REV. 251 (1974); Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional
Principle, 69 J. CRIM. L.C. 141 (1978).
54. This rationale supporting the exclusionary rule is grounded in the notion that
courts that admit evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution acquiesce in that
770 Vol. 19:763
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also deters law enforcement officals from transgressing the guarantees
which are afforded the citizenry by the fourth amendment 5 The deter-
rence rationale has emerged as the sole justification for the continued
existence of the exclusionary rule." Accordingly, exclusion of unlawful-
ly obtained evidence is constitutionally required only when the deter-
rence function is operating at a maximumY
The Supreme Court has restricted the scope of the rule in accor-
dance with this deterrence analysis. In Alderman v. United States"
the Court restricted the applicability of the rule by holding that only
those whose rights were violated by an unlawful search would be able
to invoke the benefits of the rule." In imposing this standing require-
ment, the Court reasoned that the deterrence provided by extending
the rule to persons not personally aggrieved by the search did not
justify its extension when balanced against the infringement of the
public's interest in having those accused of crime prosecuted on all the
evidence.' In United States v. Calandra6" the Court refused to extend
the rule to grand jury proceedings, holding that a witness may not refuse
to answer questions because they are based on evidence obtained in an
unlawful search . 2 The Court reasoned that the undue hardship placed
upon grand jury proceedings could not be justified by the incremental
deterrent effect which could be expected by such an extension. 3 The
Court defined deterrence in terms of removing the incentive to violate
the fourth amendment. Therefore, any incentive to violate the fourth
amendment which would be removed by not allowing the derivative use
of the evidence to obtain an indictment would be negated by the ad-
missibility of the unlawfully seized evidence at the subsequent criminal
trial of the search victim." Consequently, the deterrent value of the
violation and therefore are "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they
are sworn to uphold." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960). Speaking for the
majority in Mapp v. Ohio, Justice Clark expressed this view when he noted that
"[n]othing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." 367 U.S. at 659.
55. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
484-85 (1976); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
57. See Note, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: Pas Present No Future,
12 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 507, 517 (1975).
58. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
59. Id. at 174.
60. Id at 174-75.
61. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
62. Id. at 351-52.
63. Id at 349-52.
64. Id. at 351.
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rule was not operating at a maximum in this situation. In Stone v.
Powel16 5 the Court barred the consideration of search and seizure
claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings where the litigant had an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim at the state court
level.m Again, the Court concluded that the policies behind the exclu-
sionary rule were not absolute.17 Consequently, the increased cost to
society in the form of dissatisfaction with a judicial system reviewing
the same claim at least three times, outweighed any additional
disincentive which might be achieved by application of the rule. The
Court has employed a similar balancing approach in the evolution of
the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule. This exception is
of great moment because it restricts the operation of the rule at trial.69
United States v. Havens is the Court's most recent pronouncement
on the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution to im-
peach a defendant-witness. In Agnello v. United States7" the Supreme
Court held that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment, and therefore not admissible in the Government's case in chief,
could not be used to impeach testimony given by the defendant for the
first time on cross-examination. By taking great care to distinguish the
holding of Agnello,7' the Court reaffirmed that decision in Wader v.
United States.7 1 Walder was interpreted as providing a limited excep-
tion to the general rule of Agnello,3 allowing admission of illegally
seized physical evidence to impeach perjurous testimony given on
direct examination, provided, however, that the impeaching evidence,
and the impeachment itself, went to matters that were collateral to the
crime charged in the indictment.7 ' Thus, Walder appeared to preserve
65. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
66. Id at 494-95.
67. Id. at 488.
68. Id. at 493.
69. The Supreme Court has also held that the rule should be invoked reluctantly
where an unlawful search produces a live witness, as opposed to an inanimate object.
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1978).
70. See note 8 supra.
71. See note 70 and accompanying text supra; People v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d 174, 178,
501 P.2d 918, 922, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350, 354 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 863 (1973).
72. See note 4 supra.
73. See W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
11.6 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LA FAVE].
74. See, e.g., Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Lockley v. United
States, 270 F.2d 915, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Burger, J., dissenting). See also Kent, Miranda
v. Arizona, The use of Inadmissible Evidence For Impeachment Purposes, 18 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 1177 (1967); LA FAVE supra note 73; Comment, The Impeachment Exception:
Decline of the Exclusionary Rule? 8 IND. L. REV. 865, 882 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Decline of the Exclusionary Rule]; The Supreme Court 1953 Term, 68 HARV. L. REV. 104,
114 (1954); Note, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 706, 709 (1973).
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for the criminally accused the right to take the stand in their own
behalf and deny the offenses charged without having illegally obtained
evidence of a highly incriminating nature used against them for im-
peachment." In practice, application of the Walder collateral impeach-
ment rule proved extremely difficult. Courts were faced with the task
of distinguishing between a defendant who merely denied the elements
of the crime charged, and one who went beyond this and offered per-
jurous collateral testimony on direct examination, thus opening the
door to impeachment.71
The problems of characterization posed by the Walder direct-
collateral dichotomy were eliminated in Harris v. New York. 77 In Har-
ris the statements used to impeach the defendant's direct testimony
were incriminating with respect to the matters covered in the indict-
ment.78 Harris provoked comment to the effect that Agnello and
Walder had been overruled, or at least substantially weakened. 79
Although Harris involved the use of statements obtained in violation
of the fifth amendment Miranda guarantees' to impeach the defendant-
witness, the impact of Harris on fourth amendment impeachment cases
was obvious. 1 Language in the Harris opinion regarding the Court's
view of the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule indicated that
the decision was not limited to fifth amendment impeachment cases.
Harris thus has been viewed correctly as an extension of the doctrine
that unconstitutionally obtained evidence must be available to the pro-
75. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. at 65. See also Johnson v. United States, 344
F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (illegally obtained evidence which is not admissible in the pro-
secution's main case does not become admissible because the defendant takes the stand).
76. LOUISELL & MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 43 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
LOUISELL & MUELLER]. This difficulty led one court to conclude that:
The defendant's testimony will often be a chain of intimately connected events.
Separation of the specifics of his testimony into one group of direct issues and one
group of collateral issues, or separation according to one or the other supposedly
simple distinctions, would ordinarily be an extremely difficult, if not impossible
task.
Grosshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 179 (9th Cir. 1968). See also State v. Brewton,
274 Or. 241 (1967), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 851 (1975).
77. See note 16 supra.
78. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 222. See also Kent, Harris v. New York. The
Death Knell of Miranda & Walder? 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 357, 360-61 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Kent].
79. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 25, at § 178; Dershowitz & Ely, Some Anxious
Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J.
1198, 1214 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz & Ely]; Kent, supra note 78, at 365-66;
Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 73 COL.
uM. L. REV. 1478, 1483 (1973).
80. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 224. See also Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 79,
at 1208-09.
81. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, note 76 supra.
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secution to prevent the commission of perjury by the defendant-
witnesses.2 The emphasis in Harris on the need to prevent perjury
when a defendant testifies suggested that the scope of the exception is
not to be limited to perjurous testimony given on direct examination."
By permitting impeachment of statements first elicited on cross-
examination, Havens has made this suggestion a reality.
In extending the impeachment exception to testimony first elicited
on cross-examination, the Havens Court relies primarily upon Harris
and the balancing approach found therein." The truth-seeking and fact-
finding goals of the criminal justice system are balanced against the
deterrence that would result if use of the evidence was barred. 5 The
Court in Stone and Calandra engaged in a similar balancing approach
to restrict the operation of the rule.8 In balancing the competing in-
terests against the deterrent effects of the rule, the Court has not
discussed the effect of their decisions upon the deterrence rationale to
which they ostensibly subscribe.'
The exclusionary rule deters law enforcement officials from
deliberate violations of the fourth amendment not by punishing them,"
but rather by removing the inducement to violate the amendment. 9 In
United States v. Janis° the Court concluded that empirical data
demonstrating the deterrent effect of the rule was inconclusive at
best. " However, because the pronouncements of Weeks and Mapp have
not been overruled, the Court must believe that the rule operates as a
deterrent of deliberate police misconduct.
Two possible theories of how the rule operates exist. The first
assumes that policemen in gathering evidence make a conscious assess-
ment of the uses for the evidence. Accordingly, the officer makes an il-
legal search only when evidence will be helpful because the exceptions
to the exclusionary rule allow its use in some fashion, or because it
may be helpful in turning up leads in an investigation. If this were the
82. See LAFAVE, note 73 supra.
83. LOUISELL & MUELLER, note 76 supra
84. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. at 626. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at
225; Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1476, 1482 (1973).
85. 446 U.S. at 627.
86. See notes 61-69 and accompanying text supra.
87. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 492.
88. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id at 557 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 431 (1974); Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 79 at 1219.
90. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
91. Id. at 453. For a collection of empirical studies on the deterrent effect of the ex-
clusionary rule, see id. at 450 n.22.
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theory accepted by the Court, the standing requirement12 and impeach-
ment exception would be without logical justification because these ex-
ceptions provide incentive for violation of the fourth amendment .
3
A second theory of the operation of the rule assumes that the rule
deters by creating in the minds of law enforcement officals a general
impression that society does not tolerate the deliberate disregard of
fourth amendment protections.94 Acceptance of this theory is evidenced
by language in the Stone opinion. There the Court in distinguishing
between the immediate and long-term effects of exclusion noted that
the long-term objective of the rule is to inculcate fourth amendment
ideals into the value system of law enforcement officials. 5 A few excep-
tions to the rule will probably do no harm to this overall impression.
The current members of the Court, however, have not evidenced a
favorable disposition toward the exclusionary rule" and cases such as
Stone, Calandra, Harris, and Havens are illustrative of Court's
dissatisfaction with the rule as a vehicle for enforcing the fourth
amendment. Accordingly, the current state of the rule is not limited to
a few exceptions; rather the Court has restricted the reach of the rule
92. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); text accompanying notes
58-60 supra.
93. See Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary
Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L.
REv. 740, 782-83 (1974); Dershowitz & Ely, note 79 supra, at 1221 n.93.
94. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 492.
95. Id. More specifically, Justice Powell wrote that:
Despite the absence of supportive empirical evidence, we have assumed that the
immediate effect of exclusion will be to discourage law enforcement officials from
violating the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. More
importantly, over the long term, this demonstration that our society attaches
serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought to encourage
those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement
them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system.
Id. (footnotes omited).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (exclusion is not always
mandated when the product of an illegal search is a live witness); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976) (when opportunity exists for full and fair litigation of search and seizure
claim in state court, such claim is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceeding);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (evidence unlawfully obtained by state criminal
law enforcement officials is admissible in civil tax assessment proceeding conducted by
the federal government); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (standards for
border searches delineated in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), are
not to receive retroactive application because the policies of the exclusionary rule do not
require such an application); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1973) (grand jury
witness may not refuse to answer questions because they are based upon evidence which
was unlawfully obtained). See generally Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman? 14 AM.
U.L. R.v. 1 (1964).
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at every opportunity. 7 It seems that repeated restrictions of the rule
will give law enforcement officials the general impression that exclu-
sion of evidence is the exception rather than the rule.98 Havens, when
viewed alone, may have an innocuous effect on the deterrence function
of the rule. However, when viewed in the context of other cases, it will
help to destroy the impression that the rule was intended to create,
and it may very well encourage illegal searches.
The Havens Court has implemented a test which examines the scope
of the direct testimony of a defendant to determine when a defendant
may be impeached on cross-examination by the 'use of illegally seized
evidence." The Court's test is similar to the approach of rule 611(B) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence for determining the permissible scope of
cross-examination.100 The Court stated that there is no difference of
constitutional magnitude between questions answered on direct and
those questions which are reasonably related to the direct examination
but are asked for the first time on cross-examination.10' Accordingly, it
is clear that the permissible scope of cross-examination is not to be
limited by the presence of fourth amendment considerations in a par-
ticular case. It is likely, therefore, that the analysis employed by
federal courts in resolving rule 611(B) issues will serve as a benchmark
for the resolution of future disputes involving the impeachment excep-
tion. Rule 611(B) has been accorded a broad interpretation by the
courts, possibly because of the inherent difficulty with a standard
which purports to delineate the confines of what a witness said on
direct examination.' Thus, a real possibility exists that impeachment
97. See Schlesinger & Wilson, Property, Privacy and Deterrence: The Exclusionary
Rule in Search of a Rationale, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 225, 238 (1980).
98. Dershowitz & Ely, note 79 supra, at 1221 n.93. See Comment, On the Limitations
of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research
and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 740, 784 (1974).
99. The Court noted that the proper scope of cross-examination should be limited to
questions which are either "plainly within the scope of the direct examination," or are
"reasonably suggested" by the defendant's direct examination. 446 U.S. at 627.
100. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide in relevant part that "cross examination
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination . FED. R. EvlD.
611(B).
101. See 446 U.S. at 627.
102. See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (implicit in rule 611(B)
is that all evidence relevant to the subject matter of direct is within the scope of cross ex-
amination), cert denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th
Cir. 1977) (focus is not on what was actually said on direct but rather if the cross examina-
tion is reasonably related to what was said on direct), cert denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978);
United States v. Segal, 534 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1976) (scope of direct is to be measured by its
subject matter not by the specific exhibits introduced at that time).
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admissibility will depend not on what the defendant said on direct, but
rather that he elected to say anything at all.1 13
The Havens Court has alleviated the danger that a defendant
witness will use suppression as a shield for half-truths."' They have,
however, created another danger-that a liberal interpretation of
Havens may erode the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule.
Francis C. Rapp, Jr.
103. See 446 U.S. at 632 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also LOUISELL & MEULLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 43 (1980 Supp.) (if the Havens test means anything at all it will re-
quire the drawing of difficult distinctions to determine what is within and without the
scope of direct).
104. 446 U.S. at 626. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 226.

